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TORTS-Master-Servant-Automobile Accident Liability. Sun Land & Cattle
Co. v. Brown, 394 P.2d 387 (Wyo. 1964).

Baker, an employee of defendant-Sun Land & Cattle
Company, used his employer's pickup truck to retrieve his
personal saddle from a fence at a rodeo grounds where it had
been left the day before after a neighborhood rodeo. Baker also planned to contact several persons in regard to the possible
sale of the saddle during the trip. After retrieving the saddle
and contacting the possible purchasers of the item, the employee and the truck were involved in a serious, almost headon, two vehicle accident near Bairoil, Wyoming, on the way
back to defendant-employer's ranch. In a civil action following the accident, evidence was introduced by defendants to
the effect that the vehicle was not being properly used in
company business at the time of the collision, that the actual
purpose of the trip was as stated above, that the truck did
carry some ranching equipment owned by the defendant-employer, and that a saddle was furnished to Baker by Sun
for his use on the ranch. No evidence was introduced to the
effect that Sun knew Baker was using his own saddle on
occasion in his ranching duties, or that it was required to
be used, or that the furnished saddle was unfit for use. There
were no conflicts, vagueness, or inconsistencies in the evidence presented by the defendants. All evidence produced
by the defendants was left unchallenged, uncontroverted and
uncontradicted by plaintiffs and it was shown clearly that
Baker was not within the scope or course of his employment
when the accident occurred. The jury paid little attention
to this and found for the plaintiffs. Upon appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court decision of the trial court was affirmed.
In affirming, the court held that the employee's trip was
sufficiently connected with his employment to place him within the scope of employment and that only the evidence most
favorable to the successful party, together with all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, may be considered, and
conflicting evidence of the unsuccessful party must be disregarded.
It has been stated that proof of ownership of a vehicle
driven by one other than the owner raises a prima facie presumption that the driver was the owner's agent and was actPublished by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1967
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ing within the scope of his authority or employment.' However, this may be overcome as a matter of law by other evidence.' It has also been stated that the plaintiff must, to establish a prima facie case that employee was driving the vehicle in the course and scope of his employment, come forward with something more than an attack upon the credibility

of adverse witnesses.3
The settled law pertaining to master-servant relations
and scope or course of employment indicates that the master
is liable only when the instrumentality is being used by the
servant for the purpose of advancing the employer's business
or interests as 'distinguished from the private affairs of
the servant.4 It also has been stated that upon introduction
of evidence showing that at the time of the accident the employee was using the employer's auto to carry out a personal
errand for his own convenience, it has frequently been held as
a matter of law that he was acting outside the scope of his employment so that the employer could not be held liable.' In
general, the question whether an employee-driver was acting
within the scope of his employment involves an inquiry into
the contract and factors of employment and the relation of
his acts at the time of the accident to the service he actually
performed pursuant to his employment.' Any use of the motor vehicle which is reasonably incidental to the performance
of the duties with which the employee is charged is ordinarily
deemed to be within the scope of his employment! Whether
an employee was acting within the course or scope of his employment at the time of an accident involving a vehicle owned
by the employer is a fact question for a jury on conflicting
evidence, but becomes a question of law for the court if the
facts are undisputed and reasonable minds cannot differ as
to the justifiable inferences and conclusions to be drawn from
the evidence
In an Arizona case it was said that where the driving in1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Summerville v. Gillespie, 181 Ore. 144, 179 P.2d 719 (1947).
Ibid.
Balise v. Underwood, 62 Wash.2d 195, 381 P.2d 966 (1963).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 238, at 527 (1958).
Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 8, at 50 (1957).
8 AM. JUi. 2d Automobiles & Highway Traffic § 617, at 168 (1963).
Ibid.
McNew v. Puget Sound Pulp & Timber Co., 37 Wash.2d 495, 224 P.2d 627
(1950).
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volve'd is, in actuality, an independent journey as distinguished from a mere detour, the servant is pursuing an enterprise of his own and the master is not liable for the servant's
conduct during the trip.' In a later case the Colorado Supreme Court held in a case of a requested instruction that if
the jury should find that defendants would have realized
some incidental benefit from the use of their truck by an employee, such incidental benefit alone would not make defendants responsible for actions of the employee in the operation of the truck.1" In another case, decided in the State of
Washington, it appeared that its Supreme Court was applying the applicable law rigidly." In that case an employee of
a freight company had duties of soliciting freight from customers, those duties included taking customers and potential customers on hunting and fishing trips on holidays and
weekends. At the time of the accident the employee had the
use of the employer's automobile on a weekend to make a trip
with his family to a lake for the express purpose of testing
sights on a deer rifle in contemplation of taking several customers deer hunting a week later. The court held that the employee's scope of employment could not be stretched to include this venture and that the employer was not liable.1 2 In
a Wyoming case decided in 1959, upon which the majority of
the court in Brown relied, it was found that the defendant was
clearly and without question an employee of the 'defendant
company and that he was acting within the scope of his employment. 3 That case involved a new employee, hired on the
day of the accident involved, using his own vehicle and being directed by another employee on a very clear and definite
mission for the defendant ranch owners pertaining to picking up a third employee at a predetermined location." It
would appear that there was no real question of liability here
as the facts were clear, concise and uncontradicted.
In deciding the Brown case the court, in holding the defendant-owner of the vehicle involved liable, relied on the
presence of ranching equipment (wire stretchers, wire, etc.)
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

McCauley v. Steward, 63 Ariz. 524, 164 P.2d 465 (1945).
Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Howard, 129 Colo. 262, 269 P.2d 701 (1954).
Barnett v. Inland Motor Freight, 44 Wash.2d 619, 269 P.2d 592 (1954).
Ibid.
Husted v. French Creek Ranch, Inc., 333 P.2d 948 (Wyo. 1959).
Id. at 951.
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in the box of the pickup. The court felt that, to some extent,
this indicated that Baker was on a mission for his employer.
In an Oklahoma case involving a collision of the type present
in the Brown case, the defendant's truck, upon inspection after the accident, contained paperhanging tools and paper.'
The driver-employee of the defendant-owner was found to
have no pending contracts in the area of the accident scene
and the trial court held that such evidence would not be sufficient to show that the driver was within the course or scope
of his employment such that the question was not even submitted to the jury. 8 Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma affirmed the action of the trial court and stated that
where a plaintiff establishes a prima facie presumption that
the person driving the truck was an employee of the defendant-owner acting within the scope of his employment, such
presumption is dispelled when the defendant shows by clear,
convincing, undisputed and not inherently probable evidence
that the driver was not acting within the scope of his employment.1" In such a case, the court said, the trial court would
commit error in denying a motion for a directed verdict if
made by the defendant-owner."
In conjunction with the problem of scope or course of
employment involved in the Brown case, there was also the
problem regarding the amount or sufficiency of evidence
needed to support the findings of the trial court upon appeal.
It is a general rule that the findings of the trial court are presumed to be supported by sufficient evidence and a contrary
assumption will not be made by the reviewing court. 9 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings, the appellate court will give the strongest probative
value or force to the evidence in support of the findings and
will consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings made by the trial court.2" Also, in determining whether
there is evidence to sustain the findings, only the evidence
arid inferences favorable to the findings will be considered. '
15. Pollard v. Grimes, 202 Okla. 118, 210 P.2d 778 (1949).
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. 5 CJ.S. Appeal & Error § 1564(6) (1958).
20. Id. at p. 1278.
21. Ibid.
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However, where there is no substantial conflict in the evidence, it has been often held that the presumption in favor of
the trial court's conclusion does not apply, as where a trial
court appears to have taken an erroneous view of the law as
applied to the facts.22
In 1957 the Wyoming Supreme Court was following these
rules quite explicitly.28 In 1956 the court stated that where the
assignments of error are that the judgment of the trial court
is not sustained by sufficient evidence or is contrary to the
evidence and is contrary to the law, the Supreme Court must
assume that the evidence in favor of the successful party is
true and must not consider evidence of the unsuccessful party
in conflict therewith, but must give to the evidence of successful party every favorable inference which may reasonably
and fairly be 'drawn from it.24 Again the same year the court
reiterated this stand when it stated that in determining the
validity of a judgment of a trial court, it will consider only
testimony favorable to the party for whom the judgment was
rendered. 5 Other cases stated the same rule, and in so 'doing,
always emphasized the statement that conflicting evidence of
the unsuccessful party may be disregarded." It also stated
that the court would not be bound by contradictions between
the favorable testimony of the witnesses of the successful parties and the physical facts.2 7 The court, in 1963, discussed its
duty in regard to drawing inferences and disregarding conflicting evidence.28
In the principal case it certainly cannot be argued that
the Supreme Court disregarded evidence and testimony. It
went along with the general rule as to the sufficiency of evidence and extended that rule to the breaking point. As noted
earlier, there was no conflicting evidence pointed out in the
opinion in Brown and the plaintiffs offered little or no evidence other than information substantiating their claims
for damages due to bodily injury suffered by them from all
indications. They did not challenge or cast doubt upon the evi22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 1288-89.
Fisher v. Robbins, 78 Wyo. 50, 319 P.2d 116 (1957).
Trail Motors, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 76 Wyo. 152, 301 P.2d 775 (1956).
Strom v. Felton, 76 Wyo. 370, 302 P.2d 917 (1956).
Oeland v. Neuman Transit Co., 365 P.2d 806 (Wyo. 1961).
Id. at 808.
Brasel & Sims Constr. Co. v. Neuman Transit Co., 378 P.2d 501 (Wyo. 1963).
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dence as presented by the defendants showing that the def endant's employee was outside the scope or course of employment when the accident occurred. It would appear that it
was plaintiffs' burden to go further and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the vehicle was being properly
used in company service at the time of the accident. This was
certainly not accomplished. From all indications the plaintiffs did not even attack the credibility of adverse witnesses.
Again, it would also appear from the manner in which the
majority opinion was written that the plaintiffs clearly did
not meet that burden and nothing is said as to whether or
not they even attempted to do so. From the opinion it is clear
that the court placed a tremendous amount of weight upon
the status of the saddle to determine their conclusion. It is
submitted that such weight could not fairly and reasonably
be presumed present or such an inference drawn from the
facts as presented. It is felt that the status of the saddle had
little or no evidentiary value to aid the court in determining
the defendant-employee's scope and course of employment.
Again, one purpose of the trip, the selling or attempted sale
of the saddle, was not contradicted by the plaintiffs. The status of the saddle and the admitted fact that the truck owned
by 'defendant-Sun Land & Cattle Co. was carrying ranch
equipment determined liability in this case without the plaintiffs' having to meet any real burden of proof. In sustaining
the trial court's decision, and with no mention of the evidence
as to the proposed sale, the Supreme Court stated quite clearly
that the principal purpose of the trip of the employee-Baker
was to acquire and use the saddle at the ranch. It further
stated that the jury could reasonably find that the purposes of
'defendant-employee would be served; therefore, the court
could not say, as a matter of law, that the employee was outside the scope or course of employment. The court also stated
that the jury was not bound to accept the statements in regard to the saddle as true nor find for defendant-employer
even if they were true, again, without the benefit of any conflicts, or vagueness, or inconsistencies present in evidence.
It clearly appears that the Wyoming Supreme Court has
extended the boundaries and provisions of the rules pertaining to sufficiency of evidence anfd burden of proof in masterservant cases together with an extension of the provisions
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss2/13
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within which an employee may be found to be within the scope
or course of his employment. It appears that the court has
disregarded case law present within these areas in writing its
opinion in the B-rown case. The court has indicated to future
injured plaintiffs in such cases that all they need do is prove
injury and damages and stand more or less mute while the
jury finds the employer liable even though his employee was
clearly outside the scope or course of his employment when
the accident occurred. It can almost be said that in Wyoming,
as a matter of law, an employee is within the scope of his employment if he is driving a vehicle owned by the employer and
carrying somewhere within that vehicle articles that pertain,
in some minor way, to his employment. Apparently nothing
else need be proven. Brown is a case in which the Wyoming
Supreme Court made a decision and in so doing was forced
to stretch the applicable law beyond the extremes of elasticity.
It is clear that this case will serve to extend the term "scope
or course of employment" in Wyoming into possibly very
dangerous waters. It further appears to be based on an obscure form of logic dictating that no matter what the law or
facts involved are, injured persons should be compensated.
It is submitted that if the Wyoming Supreme Court feels
this way it should spell out its decision more explicitly on
the basis of social or public policy and not law, in order that
all can see clearly what has occurred and will occur in the
future. The court should not hide behind quoted cases which
are clearly not applicable to a set of facts so clearly present
as in Brown.
MARK E. SHUBERT
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